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International Law on the Status of Refugees in India: Judicial Perspectives


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International Law on the Status of Refugees in India: Judicial Perspectives

Dr. Ravanan *

I - Introduction

As Swami Vivekananda observed, “I am proud to belong to a Nation which has sheltered the persecuted and the refugees of all religions and all nations of the earth" (First word of Swami Vivekananda Speech in the World Religious Conference held in Chicago USA. Available at “The Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda” Vol. 1, P.63. Sakithya Academy Library, New Delhi ). India has experienced a periodic influx of refugees mostly from its neighboring countries. Geographical, political, social and economic factors are responsible for this influx. Geographically India’s long open border with Pakistan, China-Tibet, Bhutan, Nepal, Bangladesh, Burma and Sri Lanka allows refugees come to India. Politically, dictatorship or undemocratic forms of government formed in the region have forced their citizens to search for refuge. The people in the neighboring countries often share a common social and cultural world with Indian people. This encourages many amongst the persecuted in these neighboring countries to seek asylum in India. At present, almost 300,000 refugees are being given shelter in India. (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, (UNHCR)).

The refugees can be classified as mandate and non-mandate refugees. Mandate refugees are Afghans, Iranian, Sudanese, Somalia, Iraqi, and refugees from Myanmar. They are under the protection of UNHCR. But most of the refugees in India are non-mandate refugees. These are refugee from Tibet, Bangladeshi refugees, Sindhi refugees from Pakistan, Bhutanese refugees, Ugandan refugees, and Sri Lankan Tamil refugees. These refugees are under the direct protection of the Indian government. Some refugee groups are deled by both UNHCR and the Indian government. For example, Sri Lankan Tamil refugees are recognized as refugee by the Government of India and it takes care of them. Since 1983 Sri Lankan Tamil refugees have been granted refugee status in and around Tamil Nadu. Many of these refugees are given identity documents and a small amount of financial assistance, along with subsidized food grain. They are generally permitted free movement, although there is mandatory physical attendance a few times a month. The government also provides basic health and education facilities. In case a refugee is considered a threat to national security, the administration can detain the person. There have been such instances despite the issuance of refugee identity documents by the administration. The UNHCR assists Sri Lankan Tamil refugees for repatriation. It interviews those who wish to return and verifies the voluntary nature of their repatriation from India.

India does not have specific legislation that is applicable to refugees in the country. Due to the lack of such a statute, the judicial system is constrained, when dealing with refugees. They have to apply laws that are applicable to foreigners in general, such as the Foreigners Act, 1946. The established principle of the rule of law in India as set under Article 21 of the Constitution is that no person, whether citizen or an alien, shall be deprived of her life or personal liberty except in accordance with a procedure established by law that must be fair. The Supreme Court has gone further and elevated it to the status of one of the basic structures of the Constitution, thus making this precept unamendable. ( Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain, 1975 (SC) AIR 2299 ).

The Supreme Court has consistently upheld the principle of non-refoulment, though without specifically mentioning it, an important principle in international refugee law. But as the former Chief Justice of India J S Verma has pointed out, “the attempt to fill the void by judicial creativity can only be a temporary phase. Legislation alone will provide a permanent solution”. It clearly shows that India must have a domestic legal and legislative framework to help guide its response to the refugee issue. Recently, on September 20, 2011, a trial Court in Dwarka, NCT of Delhi pointed out that the need for enacting comprehensive legislation to deal exclusively with the problems of refugees had arisen from time immemorial, and finally, pursuant extensive deliberations on a model national law: The Refugee and Asylum Seekers (Protection) Bill, 2006 was drafted. But it is unfortunate that despite its having been drafted after due deliberations and after various rounds of consultations by eminent jurist including the former Chief Justice of India, P.N. Bhagwati, this bill has not seen the light of the day. The judge also mentioned there have been a plethora of instances wherein Indian courts tried to evolve a humane and compassionate approach to redress individual problems; however, in the absence of a long-term, consistent and uniform solution by the way of enactment of national legislation, their treatment would be subject to and would depend upon the individual outlook, social inclinations and other idiosyncrasies which would make it difficult for the subordinate courts to follow. Indian needs to live up to its humanitarian goals.It is therefore high time to enact a domestic legislative framework to help guide its response to the refugee issue.

II - International Refugee Law

International refugee law is an outgrowth of general principles of international law, human rights, and humanitarian law. The general principles of international law lay down the norms of sovereign equality of states as well as territorial supremacy over the subjects within their territories as well as respect for human rights. International human rights law obliges states to protect the fundamental rights of all human beings, particularly the right to life and liberty, without discrimination on the grounds of race, religion, language, political opinion or nationality. Like conventional obligations, international standards on the protection of refugees have universal respectability and acceptance and are applicable in all refugee situations. The states are obliged to protect and accord a minimum standard of treatment to refugees. However, India is not a party to any international instruments deals with refugees but India practicing customary international norms and principles on refugees better than international refugee instruments.

(a) Definition of the Term Refugees

Defining the term ‘Refugee’ is the first requirement for its prosecution. Lack of Legislation for refugees in India we need to look out several international and regional legal instruments to define the term refugees, However, the definition contained in the 1951 Convention is the most widely accepted definition ( The 1951 Convention refugee definition is of singular importance because it has been subscribed to by more than one hundred nations in the only refugee accords of global scope. Many nations have also chosen to import this standard into their domestic immigration legislation as the basis upon which asylum and other protection decisions are made. (Hathaway 1991: 5)) as it is retained and expanded in the Statutes of the 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (hereafter the OAU Convention), ( Article 1 (2) of the OAU Convention expands and includes reasons such as, The term ‘refugee’ shall also apply to every person who, owing to (i) External aggression, (ii) Occupation, (iii) Foreign domination or Events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin or nationality.) and in the Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, 1984 (hereafter the Cartagena Declaration) (Section III.3 of the Cartagena Declaration for refugees in Latin America 1984 which provides that the term ‘refugee’ shall also apply to Central America area as the reasons like, Hence the definition or concept of a refugee to be recommended for use in the region is one which, in addition to containing the elements of the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol, includes among refugees persons who have fled their country because their lives, safety of freedom have been threatened by (i) Generalized violence, (ii) Internal conflicts, (iii) Foreign aggression, (iv) Massive violation of human rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order). Article 1 (2) of the 1951 Convention definition of the term refugee is considered as the universally accepted term. ( Article 1(a) (2) of the 1951 Convention reads: “Refugee as a person who owing to (a) well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of (i) race, (ii) religion, (iii) nationality, (iv) membership of a particular social group or political opinion, (b) is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or (c) who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, (d) Owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it”). The Asian African Legal Consultative Committee (hereafter AALCC) defines the term ‘refugee’ as the same as the 1951 Convention. At the same, it takes criteria from OAU Convention, the Cartagena Declaration and additionally includes reasons like color, ethnic origin, gender and also external aggression, foreign domination, and events seriously disturbing public order. So it offers a broad definition of the term refugees. “At the regional level though, unlike the OAU Convention, the Cartagena Deceleration is not a formally binding legal instrument, its broader definition has gradually become the established norm throughout Central America.” ( Arboleda Eduardo (1991), Refugee Definition in Africa and Latin America: The lessons of Pragmatism, International Journal of Refugee Law, 3(2): 186-205). However the above said legal instruments uniformly mention four key features for fulfilling the refugee definitions, first, the person must be outside the country of the region. Second, that person must have a well-founded fear. ( For example, in INS vs. Cardoza Fouseca (1987 (46) USSC 407) US Supreme Court states: the moderate interpretation of the ‘well-founded fear’ standard would indicate that so long as an objective situation is established by the evidence, it need not be shown that the situation will probably result in persecution, but it is enough that persecution is a reasonable possibility. And the Judgment of the \house of Lords in R vs. Secretary of the Home Department Ex Parte Sivakumaran (1988) (1) AII E.R.193 (H.L.), suggests that the test should consider whether there is evidence of a “real and substantial danger of persecution.” The Canadian Federal Court of Appeal considered the above and disapproved of the House of Lords formulation in Joseph Adjei vs. Ministry of Employment & Immigration (1989) (7:2d) Imm.L.R 169) the Court adopted the “reasonable chance” standard). Third, there must be a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons like race (For example, in Patel et al Vs. The United Kingdom, Application No. 4403/700 of Oct 1970 The International Court of Justice states that the discrimination likely to be faced by a Kenyan citizen of Asian origin did not amount to persecution. Discrimination on such grounds can, in certain circumstances, constitute degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights.), religion (For example, in Kojjnakis Vs. Greece, 3/1992/348/421, European Court of Human Rights, 25 May 1993, the Court pointed out that the Article 18 of ICCPR and Article 18 of UDHR prescribe that everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, which shall include the freedom to have or adopt a religion or belief of choice and the freedom to manifest such a religion or belief. Articles 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights also expressly recognizes the freedom to change once religion or belief. However, a distinction may be drawn between the freedom to practice a religious belief and the right to proselytize.). Nationality, Political Opinion, Membership of A Social Group, etc., Fourth, that person’s home country is unwilling to protect his/her life or freedom.

(b) Principle of Non Refoulement

“The term non-refoulement or no return, it derives from the French refouler, which means to drive back or to repel, as of an enemy who fails to breach one’s defense" (Goodwin-Gill. Guy S (1985), The Refugee in International Law, New York: Oxford University Press, p. 69.).
The principle of non-refoulment states, broadly, that no refugee should be returned to any country where he or she is likely to face persecution or danger to life or freedom. Article 33 (1) of the 1951 Convention states that: No State shall expel or return (refouler) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion”. It is considered as the heart of the 1951 Convention and it also considered as a principle norm of customary International law. It is now also incorporated into international human rights law. Article (3) of the Convention Against Torture 1984 (CAT) states that no persons can be sent back to a country where there is reasonable fear of torture.

In 1951 Convention Article 33 (2) is exception for Article 33 (1). It states that provision may not apply to a refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country. The evidence relating to the meaning and scope of non-refoulement in its Conventional sense also amply supports the conclusion that today the principle forms part of general international law. At the same time, CAT convention has no exclusion clause, it strengthens the Non Refoulment principle respectively.

In Kirkwood case, European Commission on Human Rights states, “if conditions in a country are such that the risk of serious treatment and the severity of that treatment falls within the scope of Article 3, a decision to deport, extradite or expel an individual to face such conditions incurs the responsibility, of the contracting state which so decides." In Chahal Case, “The expulsion may engage the responsibility is a state under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights where substantial grounds were shown for believing there would be a real risk to the deportee of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in the country. The European Court went even further in its decision in case Ahmed vs. Austria. Thus, as long as there was a risk of the applicant being tortured on his return to Somalia, any attempt to deport him made by the Austrian authorities would be in breach of Austria’s obligation under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. It should, however, be noted in that the United States Supreme Court case, has violated the principle of non-refoulment. In this case, an executive order passed by the US government authorizing the US Coast Guard to intercept vessels transporting Haitians to the US and to repatriate them was upheld by the Supreme Court as not falling foul of Article 33 of the 1951 Convention. In Refugee Casethe Federal Administrative Court of Germany held that a refugee found to be unlawfully in the country should be expelled, provides she was not returned to the country in which her life or freedom would be threatened. An almost identical conclusion was reached in the US in the Chim Case. In the expulsion of the alien case, the Austrian Supreme Court, upholding an expulsion order, observed that it merely required a person to leave the state; it did not render her liable to be returned to a specific foreign country.

(c) The Concept of Asylum Seekers and Refugee Status

Article 14 (1) Universal Declaration of Human rights clearly states that ‘every person has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution’. But it doesn’t say every person has the right to be granted asylum. Whether to grant asylum or not is a right that rests with sovereign states. They make the final determination. Moore, in 1908, noted that the right to grant asylum ‘is to be exercised by the government in the light of its own interests, and of its obligations as a representative of social order.

Granting asylum to a refugee within a territory has been the sovereign right of every state. In Cruz-Varas case the European Court of Human Rights held that the expulsion of an asylum seeker may engage the responsibility of the expelling state under Article 3, “where substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person concerned faced real risk of being subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in the country to which he was returned.” However, the court also stressed that the ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity in its application of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, the court has constantly maintained a high standard of proof while simultaneously conceding considerable substantive and procedural room to national authorities. In the asylum, case court states that the States remain remains under no obligation to grant asylum, while protection within a state “Implies only the normal exercise of territorial sovereignty." Save is so far as it does not trespass upon the state’s other obligations under international law, the sovereign act comprising the beneficial exercise of territorial jurisdiction is entitled to respect by all the other states, including the country of origin of the refugee. The exclusion clause of the 1951 Convention states the Convention is not applicable to those who have acted contrary to the purpose and principles of the United Nations. Significant trafficking in a dangerous illicit drug constitutes an act that is contrary to UN purposes and principles and would thus form the basis of exclusion from the refugee category.

Article 1 (f) of the 1951 Convention contains the exclusion clauses. Under it three categories of persons will not be granted refugee status. These persons are excluded from the benefits of refugee status. These are any person who has committed crime against peace, war crime or crime against humanity as defined in the International humanitarian law. The second group of persons excluded from the definition are any person who has committed serious nonpolitical crimes like murder, rape, etc., and prior to seeking refugee status. Third is general category a person who has been had guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the U.N Charter like aggressive war etc. These exclusion clauses need to be interpreted very restrictively, because if a broad interpretation of this exclusion clause is made, it may end up denying protection to some person who deserves refugee status. It may lead to the deportation of the person back to the countries where his person’s life or freedom is in danger.

Salient Features of the 1951 Convention

(a) Rights of Refugees

The 1951 Convention grants a number of rights to the refugees. These are civil and political rights as well as social, cultural and economic rights. These rights are spelt out in the Convention. For example, the rights of employment, right of welfare, like rationing, housing, education, etc. And right to freedom of movement, access to court, and right to intellectual property and right of association are also mentioned as a rights of refugees. Under the Convention, there is a reservation clause contained in Article - 42. At the same time, there are some rights to which no reservation is permissible. These rights include Article - 1 Definition of the term refugees. Article - 3 right of nondiscrimination, its includes race, religion or country of origin. Article - 4 Religion, Article - 16 (1), and Article - 33 non refoulement.

(b) Safeguard measures

First, article 9 of the 1951 Convention states that detention can be done but only on exceptional situations where either the person is committing fraud like presenting or submitting fraudulent papers, or there is a threat to the national security of that country, etc.

Second, article 31 of the 1951 Convention speaks about refugees present unlawfully in the country of refuge. According to this article if a person enters a country without proper papers or documents and claims to be a refugee he will not punish or penalize the person for not carrying proper papers. For example, if a person is without passport, visa or is smuggled into a country, he may have violated that country’s laws at the same time he is seeking refugee status, but the state shall not impose any penalties. A condition for the applicability of this article is that the person’s life or freedom is in danger in his home country.

Third safeguard clauses deal with expulsion; refugee can be expelled only if that person is a threat to the national security or public order and only after the due process of law. Article 32 (1) reads states shall not expel a refugee lawfully in their territory save on grounds of national security or public order. These are the procedural safeguards which are in the 1951 Convention in order to ensure that a person's life or freedom is in danger.

(c) Duties of Refugee and Cessation clause

According to article 2 of the 1951 Convention speaks about the duty or obligations of refugees. The refugee has the duty to obey the laws of the host country. Every refugee has duties to the country in which he finds himself, which require in particular that he conform to its laws and regulations as well as to measures taken for the maintenance of public order.

The cessation clause is contained in the article 1 (c) of the 1951 Convention. The idea of the clause is to specify the situation in which he ceases to exist have refugee status. Thus the refugee status is not a permanent status. That status gets over once the conditions under which the refugee status was granted transformed. It should be applied restrictively. It should not lead to the violation of the principle of non refoulement. Article 1 (c) states six conditions for cessation of refugee status. One that person has voluntarily re-availed himself of the protection of the country of his nationality. Second, having lost his nationality, he has voluntarily re-acquired it. Third he has acquired a new nationality and enjoys the protection of the country of his new nationality. Fourth he has voluntarily re-established himself in the country which he left or outside which he remained owing to fear of persecution. Fifth he can no longer, because the circumstances in connection with which he has been recognized as a refugee have ceased to exist, continue to refuse to avail himself of the protection of the country of his nationality. Sixth being a person who has no nationality he is, because the circumstances in connection with which he has been recognized as a refugee have ceased to exist, able to return to the country of his former habitual residence.

(d) The Principle of Burden Sharing and Burden Shifting

The principle of burden-sharing requires states to cooperate in dealing with the global refugee problem. It is not merely a moral but a legal principle. It is arguably a principle of customary international law
The Preamble to the 1951 Convention it states that the grant of asylum may place unduly heavy burdens on certain countries and that a satisfactory solution of a problem cannot be achieved without international cooperation. At the regional level article 2 (4) of the OAU Convention states that where a member state finds difficulty in continuing to grant asylum to refugees, such member state may appeal directly to other member states to, in the spirit of African solidarity and international cooperation, take appropriate measures to lighten the burden of the Member State granting asylum. The preamble paragraphs of the Cartagena Declaration mentions about burden-sharing like requesting immediate assistance from the international community for Central American refugees, to be provided either directly, or through bilateral or multilateral agreements, or through UNHCR and other organizations and agencies. The report of the AALCC also speaks about burden-sharing. The conclusion could be drawn that the principle of international solidarity in dealing with the refugee situations and the concept of burden-sharing in that context appear by now to be firmly established in the practice of States.

However, the legal principle of burden-sharing simply speaks about financial assistance for the poor world who is hosting most of the world refugees. There must however be burden sharing even at the level of asylum. This principle is strengthened by the developing countries through the refugee law instruments in their own regional level. But unfortunately, the developed states are practicing burden.

(e) Durable Solutions

Basically there are three traditional durable solutions to the refugee problem. According to Goodwin-Gill, ‘a durable solution entails a process of integration into society; it will be successful and lasting only if it allows the refugee to attain a degree of self-sufficiency, to participate in the social and economic life of the community and to retain what might be described, too summarily, as a degree of personal identity and integrity.
The solutions are first local integration, it means that where the refugee group has to remain in another country for the long period of time individual or group it integrates with the local people or host community. It is accepted by the host states for example, Chakma refugees are applying for citizenships in India that leads to local integration.

Second, resettlement in the third country it means where a country that accepted refugees gives them temporary asylum but then are resettled in another country. For example, Afghan refugees come to India and get some residence status in India. They apply to the UNHCR for resettlement to another country and are resettled in third countries. The third solution is voluntary repatriation it is the most significant solution or preferred solution. It means that people simply go back to their country when the situation becomes normal. Local integration and resettlement in third country is a subsidiary solution but voluntarily repatriation is the principal solution

India and International Refugee Law

If we compare Indian position to the 1951 Convention on the issue of refugees, India is practicing important customary international law principles like non refoulement at the policy level. India welcomes refugees from Asian and African continents and provides good treatment to them. On the issue of refugees India’s record is good. The asylums seekers are granting refugee status by the Indian government or it cooperates with the UNHCR for granting refugee status. The rights and duties of refugees are also respected by Indian government like free access to the court, providing basic facilities like ration, medicine, education and making camps for refugees. The safeguard measures which are mentioned in the 1951 convention are practiced by Indian government restrictively. Illegal entry refugees are not penalized by the government. Overall India is implementing the norms mentioned in the 1951 Convention.

However, India is not ready to become party to this Convention. It gives important eight reasons for it. First, the definition of refugee is a Eurocentric definition it only consents with the violation of civil and political rights it does not mention about violation of economic cultural and social rights. Second is the 1951 Convention was adopted in the time of cold war period after the world war so it is not concerned about the third world countries. For example, the partition in 1947 in India did not concern the developed nations. The third reason is the 1951 Convention simply contains too many rights for refugees which as a third world country India is not in a position to fulfill even for its own citizens. Fourth India is providing protection to refugees. So there is no need to become party. Fifth if India became party it would be obliged to the under article 35 of the Convention to cooperate with the office of the UNHCR. The UNHCR is perceived as a western donor organization that may act intrusively. Sixth India is arguing that most of the countries in Asia are not party to this Convention. Only Six Asian countries are party to the Convention. This is called Asian exceptionalism. Seventh is India’s presence of porous borders makes it very difficult to regulate the entry and to implement the International Convention. Finally, there is a burden-shifting, not a burden-sharing if India ratifies the Convention. There must be assurance that global burden-sharing at the level of finance and asylum will take place. However, India does not want to make any commitments with international instruments on refugees. But it commitments are governed by other instruments.

“India does not want to be tied down by an international legal obligation that impinges upon its discretion to regulate the entry of foreigners into its territory. This concern must be understood in the context of South Asia’s unstable geopolitics, not to mention its volatile ethnicities. Indian and other commentators from developing countries also call attention to the current state of flux in international refugee law. (Chimni B.S (1999), “From Resettlement to Repatriation: Towards a Critical History of Durable Solutions to Refugee Problems”, available at UNHCR.org).

III - Legal Status of Refugees in India

The Indian subcontinent has been witness to some of the largest forced population flows in contemporary history. Pia Oberoi has made an attempt to examine the problem in the Indian subcontinent There are no authoritative statistics on the number of people who have fled persecution or violence in their countries of origin to seek safety in India. However, because of India’s porous borders and accommodative policies, it is estimated that India hosted approximately 4, 35,900 refugees and asylum seekers according to the World Refugee Survey 2007. In addition, “India’s documented refugees are allegedly outnumbered by lakhs of unregistered persons who have entered the country from Nepal and Bhutan to escape violence and persecution in their countries. It is estimated that over 20 lakh Nepalese fleeing from civil conflict have entered India undetected over the open border. There are also an unknown but large number of people displaced from Bhutan because of their ethnic-Nepali origins". “There are also 17, 380 refugees, 3,710 asylum seekers, registered under UNHCR office and some from the Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Iran Iraq, Somalia and Sudan”.

Indian Laws, Policy and Practice on Refugees

In general, there is no law in India for refugees applicable to all groups. But Ragini Trakroo list out some laws related to refugees in India. She further states that.

“A number of legislative measures dealing with refugees were passed and issued under the seventh schedule of the Constitution of India. Many of them have lost their importance in the current context; they provide a useful legislative precedent. Given below is the legislation that was enacted the partition of India and before the Indian Constitution came in to effect these are East Punjab Evacuees (Administration of property) Act, 1947, UP Land Acquisition (Rehabilitation of Refugees) Act, 1948, East Punjab Refugees (Registration of Land Claims) Act, 1948, Mysore Administration of Evacuee Property (second Emergency)."

“Once the Constitution of India came into operation, the following acts were passed by Center State authorities. These rules are related to refugees, evacuees and displaced persons these are."

1. Citizenship Act, 1955 (No.57 of 1955)

2. Extradition Act, 1962 (No. 34 of 1962)

3. Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964

4. Foreigners Act, 1946 (No.31 of 1946)

5. Foreigners from Uganda Order, 1972

6. Foreigners Order, 1948

7. Illegal Migrant (Determination by Tribunals) Act, 1983 (No.39 of 1983)

8. Illegal Migrant (Determination by Tribunals) Rules, 1984

(a) Indian Constitutional Law

In general there is no law in India for refugees applicable to all groups. So Judicial System prevail granting rights for refugees by Indian laws. In the case of Luis de Readt v. Union of India, and Khudiram Chakma v. Union of India, the supreme court of India pointed out The right to life under Article 21 has been given an expansive meaning by the courts to cover the due process of law, i.e., the right not merely to an animal existence but a right to live with human dignity. The Indian Constitution law provides related provisions to refugees they are found in Articles 5 to 11, 14, 20, 21, 22, 25(1), 27, 28(3), 51(c) and 253; List I, entries 14, 18 and 19; and List III, entry 27. These provisions deals with citizenship; naturalization; aliens (excluding enemy aliens); extradition; displaced persons; fundamental rights of all people within the territory of India (including refugees); the rights of persons in criminal proceedings; and the power of parliament to recognize international treaties. Different levels of assistance and facilities. Educational opportunities, camp conditions, employment opportunities, voluntary repatriation-have been extended to special groups of refugees like Tibetans, Chakmas, Sri Lankans, and Afghans.

Article 51 is a directive principle of state policy, states that state shall endeavor to foster respect for international law and treaty obligations in the dealings of organized peoples with one another. In Vishaka vs State of Rajasthan the Supreme Court emphasized that international conventions which are not inconsistent with fundamental rights and harmony with their sprit must be read into these provisions to enlarge their meaning and content thereof so as to promote the constitutional guarantee. In Nilabati case a provision in ICCPR was referred to in support of the view taken that an enforceable right to compensation is not alien to the concept of guaranteed right as a public law remedy under Article 32, which is distinct from private law remedy in torts. The clearest discussion on the issue is found in, Maganbhai vs. Union of India, “Making of law is necessary when (international treaty or agreement operates to restrict their rights of the citizens or others or modifies the laws of the state. If the rights of the citizens or others which are justifiable are not affected. No legislation measures are needed to give effect to the agreement or treaty.” In Gramophone company case the Supreme Court held “there can be no question that nations must march with the international community and the municipal law must respect rules of international law just as nations respect international conventions. The comity of nations requires that the rules of international law may be accommodated in the municipal law even without express legislative sanction provided they do no run into conflicts with acts of parliament." In Apparel Export case the Supreme Court also reiterated the same principle and held that in case involving violations of human rights, the courts must forever remain alive to the international instruments and conventions and apply the same to a given case when there is no inconsistency between the international norms and the domestic law occupying the field." However, the court's positions are clear if an international instruments runs counter to Indian law, it cannot be relied upon. If the convention does not clash with any Indian statue, then it must be accommodated and absorbed into that latter. In peoples Union for civil liberties case the supreme court held the provisions of the covenant which elucidate and go to effectuate the fundamental rights guaranteed by our constitution can certainly be relied upon by the courts as facets of those fundamental rights and hence enforceable as such, therefore s clear enunciation of the principle that since fundamental rights are capable of an ever-expanding definition, international instruments may be incorporated into fundamental rights and enforced in this manner.

In Chakma case, the Supreme Court approvingly referred to the UDHR in the context of the refugee, “Article 14 of the UDHR, which speaks of the right to enjoy asylum, has to be interpreted in the light of the instrument as a whole, and must be taken to mean something. It implies that although an asylum seeker has no right to be granted admissions to a foreign State, equally a state, which has granted him asylum must not later return him to the country whence he came. Moreover, the Article carries considerable moral authority and embodies the legal perquisite of regional declarations and instruments". In Malavila Karlekar vs. Union of India the Supreme Court directed the authorities to check whether refugee status ought to be granted bail and that until the question is pending decision, the petitioner may not be deported. Similar orders, dated 11.09.1990, where passed by the Guwahati high court in Ms. Zonthansangpuii vs. State of Manipur. Similarly, various high courts also granted relief to refugees. In exercise of the powers granted under Article 226 of the Constitution, read with Article 21, the Guwahati high court in U. Myat Kayew and other vs. State of Manipur and other
allowed the petitioners who had entered India without valid travel documents and who were lodged in Manipur Central jail to be released on interim bail after furnishing personal bonds in order to enable them to approach UNHCR, Delhi, to seek refugee status.

However, India is not party to the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol, the principles of international law relating to refugees must be taken as incorporated directly into Indian Constitutional law via Article 21. This is so particularly in the view of the fact that India has acceded to the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the 1989 Convention on the rights of the child, and the 1979 Convention on the elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. None of the provisions of the Foreigners Act, 1946, the Registration of Foreigners Act, 1939, the Passport Act 1920, or the Passport Act, 1967, deals in any manner with refugee law. There is, therefore, no current domestic law in conflict with international conventions, treaties, and resolutions relating to refugees. Indian courts have thus achieved via judge-made law what successive governments were unable or unwilling to do. Today international refugee law stands somewhat integrated into Indian law via Article 21 of the Constitution, irrespective of the government’s decision whether or not to accede to the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol.

(b) Human Rights, IPC and Foreigners Acts

The Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 establishes the National Human Rights Commission, State Human Rights Commission and Human Rights Courts for protecting human rights of the country. The NHRC protecting refugees in human rights relating issues in India in one occasion, The National Human Rights Commission received a petition from Chakma refugees residing in the state of Arunachal Pradesh they are threatened by the All Arunachal Pradesh Student Union (AAPSU) to leave the country the issue moved the Supreme Court, indicating “that there was prima facie evidence to support the claim of the refugees. The court after considering the evidence directed that the Chakmas protected by the state government and that all those eligible and interested in applying for Indian citizenship should be dealt with according to the relevant laws.”

The Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860, applies equally to nationals, refugees and other foreigners. A refugee may be charged under sections 418, 419, 420, 468 and 471 of IPC when, for example, he has attempted to mislead Indian authorities by using fraudulent travel documents. A refugee may travel on a completely counterfeit document; he may use a genuine document where he changes the relevant information, or he may obtain a genuine document by false means. Unfortunately, the concerned state authorities often do not consider the compelling factors that may have brought the refugee to India. In many instances, the gravity of the circumstances coerces the refugee to obtain a false passport or a forged visa for entry into India. Alternatively, his country may not have been willing to provide him with genuine documents or he may not have had the time to obtain them.

However, Refugees are commonly detained for violating the following provisions of IPC: cheating by personating (section 416); cheating and dishonestly including delivery of property (section 420); forgery (section 463); and making and using forged documents (section 464).

These offenses are interrelated. A refugee may be charged with all of these offenses if he has forged a passport, visa or residential permit. Refugees detained for illegal entry into India who also possess travel documents that may be forged, false or fabricated would attract the provisions of the above sections of the Indian Penal Code and may be prosecuted for the same.

Under the Foreigners Act, all foreigners in India are required to register themselves with Foreigners Regional Registration Office (FRRO) in their area of residence. The office registers the name of the foreigner in its records and issue the person a residential permit. The lack of national legislation or specific refugee policy so the authorities followed the ad hoc policy. Some groups of refugees are issued residential permits. Afghan and Burmese refugees are issued permits allowing them to stay in India. However, refugees groups like the Iranians, Iraqis, and Sudanese have not granted such documents. However, “there are instances where refugees recognized by the Indian government, and who have been issued valid refugee identity documents, are latter prosecuted for illegal entry or overstay.”

(c) Policy, Practice, and Authorities on Refugee Issue

The administration dealing with refugees includes the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Ministry of External Affairs and other related departments of the central state governments. Under section 3 of the Foreigners Act, 1946, the administration practiced different policies for various groups of refugees. There is no central agency dealing with refugees in India. It is, therefore, possible that different administrative bodies deal with the same problem in various ways. However, in routine matters, the center communicates its policies to the home ministry in the states. At the same time, it communicates the same decision to the concerned departments, resulting in delayed decisions, with refugees taken into detention.

In some instances, “the central government may issue clear directives to the states and delegate its power under section 3 of the Foreigners Act 1946 for example, in the case of Sudanese refugees, the policy regarding Sudanese nationals who had been students in India was expressly recorded by the central government and directives to the state of Maharashtra.”

In other instances, the state and central governments are different practices in their policy in the issue of refugees in the concerned state. In NHRC v. State of Arunachal Pradesh (1996 SC AIR 1234), the central government was willing to entertain applications for citizenship from approximately 4, 012 Chakmas who were settled in Arunachal Pradesh. However, the state government refused to forward their applications and in fact stood by as repressive measures were taken against the refugees in an attempt to evict them.

Refugees normally have the freedom to move around the country with the restrictions applicable to any other foreigner. They are also allowed to practice their religion and follow their culture. In the case of refugees whose entry into India is legal or illegal subsequently legalized, there is limited interference by the administration regarding these basic freedoms. Refugees have access to the health and education facilities in India, and no discrimination is practiced against them on the basis of their refugee status. However, refugees enter India illegally or overstay the permitted period have strict restrictions on their movement in accordance with the legislation relating to foreigners, like Foreigners act, 1946, the Foreigners Order, 1948, and the Passport Act, 1967. Provisions of the Foreigners Act apply to all distinction is made in law between asylum seekers and other foreigners.

However, courts sometimes accept the special situation of refugees. But sometimes many refugees are deported because they do not have valid travel documents. This act of omission is because of the lack of a refugee status. Courts at all the time have mostly stayed deportation orders in several cases, pending a decision on refugee status and citizenship application.

.“In the case of State v. Mehmud Ghazaleh, the refugee is found of invalid or fake travel documents and violation of the law of the Indian country, the border authorities detain the refugee. After the initial investigation, the matter referred to the area police for further investigation, detention of the refugee and the registration of a first information report (FIR). The police put the accused refugee in the area prison and produce him in the local district court for trial."

In case a refugee is detected or exiting the country in established seaports and airports without travel documents, he is immediately detained by the immigration or authorized custom officers and an investigation is conducted. In case of illegal entry, the immigration authorities immediately deport the refugee to the country where he last came from. This is in violation of the principle of non-refoulment. In the pending deportation, the refugee is put in a detention cell in the immigration section of the airport or seaport the basic conditions of living are usually unsatisfactory. He has to buy his own meals also. Suppose if he deported, the cost of the transport ticket is bought by the refugee. For example, Majid Ahmed, Abdul Majid Mohd v. Union of India Case. Eva Masar Musa Ahmad case refugees who not comply with the mandatory requirement to obtain and renew residential permits so he was arrested and produced before the local sessions court. The court orders them to be detained in the local prison pending trial.

The police normally do not consider any claims of refugee status by the refugee. According to under section 3 of the foreigner Act, 1946, the administrative authorities may leave India notices to those refugees who failed to extend their travel permits or who ordered to deport by the court. In this kind of case, the refugee forcibly deported if he fails to comply with the notice.

However, a writ petition can be filed at the concerned court. Indian courts, generally strictly interpret the legislation on foreigners by refusing to interfere with the powers of the executive. But in the refugees issue the court practice a more humane approach to protect the rights of refugees in India. However, some times this approach is unsystematic and dependent upon the situation. It is an exception to the normal rule.

In 1996, the Supreme Court in National Human Rights Commission v. State of Arunachal Pradesh intervened with a liberal interpretation of the law to suggest that refugees are a class apart from foreigners deserving of the protection of Article 21 of the Constitution. The Court held at Para. 20,

“We are a country governed by the Rule of Law. Our Constitution confers certain rights on every human being and certain other rights on citizens. Every person is entitled to equality before the law and equal protection of the laws. So also, no person can be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to the procedure established by law. Thus the State is bound to protect the life and liberty of every human being, be he a citizen or otherwise, and it cannot permit anybody or group of persons, e.g., the AAPSU, to threaten the Chakmas to leave the State, failing which they would be forced to do so."

There is no real and specific recognition of the right against nonrefoulement. But courts have, on rare occasions, accorded to individual refugees the right against forced repatriation. Courts have also provided a certain measure of socio-economic protection in special circumstances. The role of the UNHCR in India has also been given a limited recognition by the judiciary. Courts have stopped deportation proceedings and ordered the release of individual refugees in order to provide them with an opportunity to approach the UNHCR for refugee status determination or to allow resettlement to take place.
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IV- Indian Judiciary in Refugee Issue

The Indian legal system for the protection of refugees may be activated in four distinct ways, 1. Humanitarian tradition, 2. International legal obligation, 3. The Constitution of India, 4. Judicial response. Indian courts, generally strictly interpret the legislation on foreigners by refusing to interfere with the powers of the executive. But in the refugees issue the court practice a more humane approach to protect the rights of refugees in India. However, some times this approach is unsystematic and dependent upon the situation. It is an exception to the normal rule. There is no real and specific recognition of the right against non refoulement. But courts have, on rare occasions, accorded to individual refugees the right against forced repatriation. Courts have also provided a certain measure of socio-economic protection in special circumstances. The role of the UNHCR in India has also been given a limited recognition by the judiciary. Courts have stopped deportation proceedings and ordered the release of individual refugees in order to provide them with an opportunity to approach the UNHCR for refugee status determination or to allow resettlement to take place. However, some of the important cases will detailed to understand the jurisprudence of the Indian courts in the matter on refugee issues. The High Courts in India have liberally adopted the rules of natural justice to refugee issues, along with recognition of the UNHCR as playing an important role in the protection of refugees. The high court of Gauhati has in various judgments recognized the refugee issue and permitted refugees to approach the UNHCR for determination of their refugee status, while staying the deportation orders issued by the lower court or the administration, in case where the refugee has been arrested for violations of the foreigner's Act. For example, in Ms. Zothansangpuli v. The State of Manipur, Mr. Bogi v. Union of India, Khy-Htoon and others v. State of Manipur, In A.C. Mohammed Siddique v. Government of India and others and P.Nedumaran v. Union of India, the Tamil Nadu High Court expressed its unwillingness to let any Sri Lankan refugees to be forced to return to their country against their will. In Nedumaran case Sri Lankan refugees prayed for a writ of Mandamus directing the union of India and the state of Tamil Nadu to permit UNHCR officials to verify the voluntariness of the refugees decision to go back to Sri Lanka; as also to permit those refugees who did not want to return continue to stay in the camps in India. In Mr. Syed Ata Mohammadi v. Union of India the Mumbai High Court was pleased to direct that there is no question of deporting the Iranian refugee to Iran, since he has been recognized as a refugee by the UNHCR. The court further permitted the refugee to travel to whichever country he desires. In Ktaer Abbas Habib Al Qutaifi v. Union of India the Gujarat High Court analyzed the plea of the petitioners that they feared persecution in their country of origin found support in a report by UNHCR. And also court pointed out that as per an order issued by the Iraqi government, the auricle of one ear of any person evading military service shall be cut off. The court further states “Humanitarian Jurisprudence is now an international creed in time of peace and war.”The Supreme Court of India in Maiwands Trust of Afghan Human Freedom Fighters v. State of Punjab and N.D. Pancholi v. State of Punjab and others stayed the deportation of refugees. In the matter of Dr. Malavika Karlekar v. Union of India,
the Supreme Court stayed the deportation of the Andaman Island Burmese refugees since “their claim for refugee status is pending determination and a prima facie case is made out for grant of refugee status. However, the supreme court consistently proceeds that the fundamental rights enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution regarding the right to life and personal liberties applies to all including aliens particularly refugees too.

In Peoples Union for civil liberties v. Union of India, the Supreme court considered Article 21, 19 (1) (a) and 19(2), 14, 32 and 51 of the Constitution. And the court citing the Kesavananda Bharathi v. State of Kerala, as “an accepted proposition of law that the rules of customary international law which are not contrary to the municipal law shall be deemed to be incorporated in the domestic law.” And also the court pointed out, in view of Article 51 of the directive principles, this court must interpret the language of the Constitution, if not intractable, which is after all a municipal law, in the light of the United Nations Charter and the solemn declaration subscribed to by India. Article 17 of the ICCPR was ratified by India and Article 12 of the UDHR was not contradictory to municipal law, they could be used to interpret Article 21 of the Constitution. In Chairman Railway board others v. Chandrima Das others the Supreme Court, discussed various international instruments, and importantly pointed out who are not citizens of this country and come here for as a tourist, or any other forms of boarding will be entitled to protect their lives accordance with the constitutional provisions. They have full right to live so long as they are here, with human dignity. The state is under an obligation to protect the life of persons who are not citizens as long as citizens of this country. And also the court pointed out life is recognized as a human right in the UDHR 1948; it has to have the same meaning and interpretation as has been placed on this word by the court in its various decisions relating to Article 21, it will be applicable not only to the citizens of this country but also to a person who may not be a citizen of the country. However, refugee’s living rights are clearly guaranteed in these Supreme Court cases.

In the name of overstay or citizenship for refugees, courts ordered different opinions in different cases for example, in Luis De Raedt v. Union of India the Petitioners petitioned the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution challenging an order dated 8 July 1987, whereby their prayer for further extension of the period of their stay in India was rejected. This case must be studied carefully because this argument is often used by state lawyers against refugees. In Hans Muller of Nuremberg v. Superintendent, Presidency Jail Calcutta the Court held that the government has an unrestricted right to expel a foreigner and that in respect of the right to be heard, there is no hard and fast rule regarding the manner in which a deportee has to be given an opportunity to place her case. The petitioners could have produced some relevant documents in support of their claim of acquisition of citizenship, but they failed to do so. This case must also be read carefully since it regularly used against refugees.

In National Human Rights Commission v. The State of Arunachal Pradesh the Supreme Court held that no one should be deprived of her life or liberty without the procedure established by law. The Court found prima facie evidence that the threat existed to the life and liberty of the
Chakmas, guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution. It also acknowledged that they were entitled to apply for citizenship under section 5 of the citizenship Act. The court held that by refusing to forward the citizenship applications of the Chakmas to the central government, the duty collector had failed in his duty and had also prevented the central government from performing its duty under the act and its rule rules. The court further stated:

We are a country governed by the Rule of Law. Our Constitution confers certain rights on every human being and certain other rights on citizens. Every person is entitled to equality before the law and equal protection of the laws. So also, no person can be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to the procedure established by law. This state is bound to protect the life and liberty of every human being, be he a citizen or otherwise.

So, the Court directed that the Arunachal Pradesh government must ensure that the life and personal liberty of the Chakmas residing within the state are protected. It also stated that the Chakmas could not be evicted from their homes nor be denied a domestic life and the comforts therein. Furthermore, it held that any Quit India notices should be dealt with by the state in accordance with the law. Finally, on the matter of citizenship, the court directed that any application for citizenship by the Chakmas under section 5 shall be dealt with properly; and that while the application of an individual Chakma is pending consideration, she should not be evicted.

The Supreme Court distinguished the National Human Rights Commission v. State of Arunachal Pradesh case from that of State of Arunachal Pradesh v. Khudiram Chakma. It held in the latter case, the court was required to consider the claim of citizenship based on the language of section 6-A, and within the narrower context of section 6-A, (2), of the citizenship Act, 1955. In the former case the court stated, the Chakmas are seeking citizenship under section 5(1) (a) of the act, which provides for citizenship by registration, and so the considerations are entirely different. In the Khudiram Chakma case, the court concentrated specifically on section 6-A (2) of the citizenship Act, 1955, section 3 of the Foreigners Act, 1946; the Foreigners Order, 1948; as well as Articles 19(1) (d) and (e) of the Constitution.

The impact of section 377 of the IPC is not measurable solely by reference to formal prosecutions resulting in reported decisions. As Delhi high court found in Naz Foundation v. Government of NCT of India (
In 2001 the Naz Foundation- a nongovernmental organization working in the field of HIV/AIDS intervention and prevention- filed a writ petition before the Delhi High Court seeking a declaration that section 377, to extent that it penalized sexual acts in private between consenting adults, violated the Indian Constitution, specifically, Articles 14 (equality before law), 15 (non-discrimination), 19 (1) (a)-(d) (freedom of speech, assembly, association and movement) and 21 (right to life and personal liberty). The Naz foundation argued that the law had a discriminatory effect because it was pre dominantly used against homosexual conduct, thereby criminalizing actively practiced more often by homosexual men and women. This was said to jeopardize HIV/AIDS prevention methods by driving homosexual men and other sexual minorities underground. It was further argued that, as private consensual relations protected under Article 21 of the Constitution, section 377 violated Article 14 on two grounds: first, because it was unreasonable and arbitrary to criminalize non procreative sexual relations, and secondly, because the legislative objective of penalizing “unnatural” acts had no rational nexus with the classification between procreative sexual acts.

In 2004, the High Court dismissed the writ petition on the grounds that only purely academic issues had been submitted which could not be examined by the court. It did the same in relation to a subsequent review petition. The Naz foundation challenged both orders and the writ petition was remitted for a fresh decision in 2006.

In its 2009 decision, the High court found in favor of the foundation and accepted its argument that consensual same-sex sexual relations between adults should be decriminalized, holding that such criminalization was in contravention of the Constitutional rights to life and personal liberty, equality before the law and non-discrimination. In reaching its decision, referring to judgment from various jurisdictions including the European Court of Human Rights, the United Kingdom, the Republic of Ireland, South Africa and the USA. The courts also relied upon a number of progressive international legal frameworks including the Yogyakarta principles and the 2008 Declaration of principles of Equality produced by the Equal Rights Trust as well as a number of reports and documents demonstrating the discriminatory effect of Section 377. In its reasoning, the High Court stated that Section 377 “grossly violates (homosexual individuals) right to privacy and liberty embodied in Article 21 insofar as it criminalizes consensual acts between adults in private”. The court also held that:

Section 377 criminalizes the acts of sexual minorities, particularly men who have sex with men. It disproportionately affects them solely on the basis of their sexual orientation. The provision runs counter to the constitutional values and the notion of human dignity which is considered to be the cornerstone of our constitution”.

The decision was appealed to the Supreme Court and attracted a large number of interveners. Interveners supporting the Appellants included organizations and individuals who have stated that they had an interest in protecting the moral, cultural and religious values of Indian society. Interveners for the respondents are composed of individuals and organizations arguing that Section 377 caused harm to the LGBT community and homosexual men in particular.) the criminalization of same-sex sexual conduct, even where not enforced, serve to entrench stigma and encourage discrimination in different spheres of life, exposing India’s LGBTQ (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender) community to harassment, blackmail, extortion, and discrimination. The Supreme Courts' consideration of these issues and the impact of section 377 of IPC on personal autonomy and privacy in general on appeal in Koushal v. Naz Foundation were notoriously cursory, as explored by Judges Sheikh and Narain. However, in this case, Article 12 of the UDHR 1948, Article 17 of the ICCPR 1966 and European Convention on Human Rights 1950 were discussed detailed apart from Article 14, 15, 19 and 21 of Constitution of India and Section 375, 376, and 377 of IPC.

The complex interplay between formal criminalization, a lack of reported prosecutions and societal stigma is reflected both in the sharp disparity between Naz Foundation and Koushal’s treatment of s 377 and to divers, unpredictable outcomes for LGBTQ Indians applying for asylum in other nations on the basis of feared persecution due to their sexual orientation or gender identity. The UK Government guidance decisions for same sex-oriented men and lesbians from India MD and AR and NH are both relatively optimistic with regard to the prospects for same sex-oriented men and women to reasonably relocate with India to escape risks of harm in their home areas; these findings depend to a significant degree upon the view that risks of harm predominantly arise from non-state actors rather than deriving in any large measures from state conduct.

But in Australia, by contrast, LGBTQ Indians have been recognized as refugees. There are 19 published decisions of Australia’s Department of Immigration and The Refugee Review Tribunal on AustLII regarding applications for asylum by LGBTQ Indians. All of these decisions related to individuals identifying, or fearing that they will be perceived, as gay, lesbian or bisexual of these, the tribunals affirmed the decisions under review that is, found that the applicants were not owed protection in 8 cases and found that the applicants possessed well-founded fears of persecution on the basis of their sexual orientation or gender identity in 11 cases. In all but one of the affirmed decisions, the tribunals found that the applicants had fabricated their claim to be homosexual or bisexual and to fear harm on that basis; in the one exception from 2001, the RRT accepted that the applicant was a lesbian but found that she could settle in one of several major cities without being subjected to discrimination because of her sexual orientation. Of the 11 remitted decisions, 3 pre-date 2009; 7 were decided after Naz Foundation but before Koushal, and one was decided after koushal case.

The government does not recognize refugees as a class, but the judiciary does recognize them. “The Indian judiciary has introduced refugee law into the legal system through the back door, as it were since the executive has shut the front door." In India some Parliamentarians and academicians have stressed the need for the appropriate legislation. Calling for the law, Rajeev Dhawan suggests that, “as refugees have no special due process rights; India’s law must match its humanitarian goals." Erika Feller, the then Director of the Department of International Protection, UNHCR, stressed the point as she said:

“Protection of refugees through the application of normal human rights principles and the ordinary judicial system must be seen as an adjunct to and not a substitute for credible national system procedures. The mere fact of frequent recourse to the ordinary courts actually underscores the need for a dedicated refugee determination process at the national level. Ideally, the ordinary courts should not be burdened by this work, except in so far as this is required for the purposes of judicial review and as a place for last resort."

However, In India, most of the personalities and institutions consistently stressed the need for legislation for refugees. But first time in India a remarkable judgment given by the judiciary system, for see the importance and seriousness about the problem of lack of legislation for refugees in India. The New Delhi Metropolitan Magistrate Court-II Dwaraka Arul Varma in his order specified the importance and urgency of the law.

In the judgment page paragraphs 19 to 24 discuss the principle of Non- Refoulment. It analyses the 1951 Convention and UNHCR Hand Book apart from other human rights instruments to which India is a party that proscribe refoulment and influence the treatment of refugees, principal among them being Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 1984, the Genocide Convention, 1948, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966, Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women, 1979, International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, 1966, Convention on the Rights of Child, 1989 and most importantly the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948.

Para’s 25 to 36 of the judgment are discussing about the “well-founded fear of persecution” the following Para’s of the affidavit filed by the convict echoes his perturbation

“If I deported to Sri Lanka, the Sri Lankan Army will put me in jail without any enquiry on the suspect of militancy/terrorism they will kill me and it is also very important to mention herein that I came to India for the purpose of only to save my life.”

The court may consider the persecution according to the present situation of Sri Lanka as per UN report So far 40,000 common people have been killed by the Sri Lankan army and there is no hope, no guarantee to secure his life in Sri Lanka. The convict also filed a book titled “What is to be done about this” edited by J. Prabakaran which contains a pictorial representation of the atrocities committed on Tamilians in Sri Lanka. The court's attention was invited to the following excerpt from this book wherein Mr. Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer, former judge of the Supreme Court of India has penned down his anguish and pain in the following words:

“The pictures in the book sent to me projects the horrendous injuries noxious by inflict. The gory scene when presented through the photos and pictures robs my sleep. Can man
even be so beastly with little babies, raping girls, mutilating men and women and massacre numbers?”

In Para 29 the judgment states that there is no universally accepted definition of persecution. However, it can be inferred that a threat to life or freedom constitutes persecution. Although it is common to think of persecution in terms of human rights violations involving imprisonment or violations of the physical integrity of the individual such as torture, there is nothing in any definition that would restrict persecution in this manner. Protection against refoulment should also be granted if the person is a member of a group against whom there exists a pattern of persecution. The problem determining the nature of the evidence required to establish a ‘well-founded fear of persecution’ remains, i.e. what constitutes a ‘good reason’ or ‘well-founded reason to fear persecution’, and how does such evidence differ from the required to establish a ‘clear probability’ that persecution will occur. And the court also discussed about the Article 21 of the Indian constitution and persecution in the Para’s of 37 to 43. The court also discussed the validity of the foreigner's Act 1946 respectively.

In Para’s 75 to 83 the court underlined the urgent need for a national legislation which stresses upon the aspect of non-refoulment and lays down provisions with respect thereto. This part of the order of the court draws upon thoroughly researched article titled ‘Creating Legal Space for Refugees in India: The milestones crossed and the roadmap for the future’ written by Prabodh Saxena. In Para 78 it states that:

“It is unfortunate that in spite of having an impressive record of welcoming refugees, we do not have a national law in place in order to cater to the specific needs of this class. An important distinction needs to be made between persons who, on their own volition and in order to earn a livelihood or to explore the world, reach the other shores of another country on one hand, and between refugee who, under compulsion and duress, has no option but to take shelter in another country. They are a victim of circumstances. They do not throng the shores of another country for any pleasure or for any kind of economic gain. They take changes as they do not have choices.”

The court also discussed the Refugee and Asylum Seekers (Protection) Bill, 2006 and observed that it was a welcome step in this direction. It is unfortunate that despite it been adopted after due deliberations and after various consultations by eminent jurists including the former Chief Justice
of India Sh. P.N. Bhagwati, this bill has not seen the light of the day. A perusal of some of the provisions would make it clear that if this bill would have been enacted, it would have gone long way in securing certain rights for the refugees. The preamble to the bill addresses the need for protection of refugees as is explicit from the following lines: “to provide for the establishment of an effective system to protect refugees and, by providing necessary social and economic protection both before and after the date of asylum”.

In the final order the court stressed the importance of national law. In Para 91 it states how can a court become a party to the persecution of an individual? The court cannot retrograde itself to the position of a mute spectator. It is high time that this bill (or another one drafted in similar lines) sees the light of the day and becomes a living document by being enacted. By doing so, lives of thousands of refugees in our country can be affected for their betterment, in as much as valuable rights can be conferred. Our commitment to adherence to international law can be fulfilled if we enact this law. The principle of non-refoulment is a basic cornerstone of basic human rights. By handing over a person to a nation where he fears persecution, would make us nothing short of abettors in that persecution. And in Para 92 states this court aware that this ex aequo et bono order seeks to fill the casus omissus left by the legislature, but it derives inspiration from the following famous words of Retd. Hon’ble justice Sh. P.N. Bhagawati spoken at a common wealth conference on “judicial interpretation in constitution law” by which he succinctly defined the role of, and expectations from a judge: “Law making is an inherent and inevitable part of the judicial process. Even where a judge is concerned with the interpretation of a statute, there is ample scope for him to develop and mould the law. It is he who infuses life and blood into the dry skeleton provided by the legislature and creates a living organism appropriate and adequate to meet the needs of the society” In Para 82 the court mentions most importantly section 7 of this bill that makes it explicit that a refugee who senses a fear of persecution ought not to be expelled/deported/removed/refouled to the country from where such fear arises.

The court ordered that convict Chandra Kumar shall not be deported and he is directed to report back to the Tahsildar, Sri Lankan refugee camp in Tamil Nadu.

On concluding the court reminded of the following verses from the poem ‘Refugee Blues’ by W.H. Auden whereby he has captured the emotions that a refugee experiences:

“Say the city has a million souls,

Some live in mansions, some live in holes:

Yet there is no place for us,

My dear, there is no place for us,

Once we had a country and we thought it fair,

Look in the atlas and you will find it there:

We cannot go there now,

My dear, we cannot go there now.
V - List of Cases on Refugees in India

(i) Reported Judgments:

Apparel Exportation Council Vs. A.K. Chopra, Civil Appeals No’s: 226-227 of 1999 (1), SCC 759, before DR A.S. Anand, C.J. and V.N. Khare, J.

Chairman Railway Board and Others Vs. Chandrima Das (Mrs) and Others, Civil Appeal No: 639 of 2000 (2), SCC 465, before S. Saghir Ahmad and R.P. Sethi, JJ.

Chief Settlement Commissioner Punjab and others Vs. Om Prakash and Others, Civil Writ Appeal No. 841 of 1962, SCR 655 of 1968 (3), before Ramaswami, J.

Ebrahim Aboobaker and Another Vs. Tek Chand Dolwani, Civil Appeal No. 65 of 1953, SCR 691, before Ghulam Hasan, J.

Gramophone Company of India Ltd Vs. Birendra Bahadur Pandey and Others, Civil Appeals Nos. 3216 to 3218 of 1984 (2) SCC 534, before Chinnappa Reddy, J.

Hans Muller of Nurenburg Vs. Superintendent Presidency Jail Calcutta and Others, writ in the nature of habeas corpus, 1995 (1), SCR 1284, before Bose, J.

Ktaer Abbas Habib Al Qutaifi and another Vs. Union of India and Others, Spl Civil appln No 3433 of 1998, CRI.L.J.919, Gujarat High Court, before N.M. Mathur.J.

Louis De Raedt Vs. Union of India and Others, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1410 of 1987, 1991 (3), SCC 554, before L.M. Sharma and J.S. Verma, JJ.

Matabar Parida Bisnu Charan Parida and anothers Vs. State of Orissa, Criminal Appeal No. 359 of 1974, 1975 (2) SCC 220, before Untwalia, J.

Moti Ram and Others Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. 1649 of 1978 (4), SCC 47, before Krishna Iyer, J.

Nilabati Behera (Smt) Alais Lalita Behera Vs. State of Orissa and Others, Civil No. 488 of 1988, 1993 (2) SCC 746, before J.S. Verma, DR. AS. Anand and N. Venkatachala, J.

National Human Rights Commission Vs. State of Arunachal Pradesh and another, Writ Petition Civil No. 720 of 1995, 1996 SCC (1) 742, before A.M. Ahmadi, C.J. and S.C. Sen, J.

Peoples Union for Civil Liberties Vs. Union of India and another, Writ petition Criminal No. 612 of 1992, 1997 (3) SCC 433, before B.P. Jeevan reddy and C. Sen, JJ.

Samaresh Chandra Bose Vs. The District Magistrate, Burdwan and Other, Writ Petitions Nos. 216-218 of 1972, AIR SCC 248, before Dua, J.

State of Arunachal Pradesh Vs. Khudiram Chakma and Others, Civil Appeal Nos. 2182 and 2181 of 1993, 1994 SUP (1) SCC 615, before M.N. Venkatachaliah, C.J. and S. Mohan, J.

M/S V.o. Tractoroexport. Moscow Vs. M/S Tarapore & Company and another, Civil Appeal Nos. 1208, 1209, 1833 and 1834 of 1964, 1970 (3) SCR 53, before J.C. Shah, V. Ramaswami and A.N. Grover, JJ.

Vishaka and Others Vs. State of Rajasthan and Others, Writ Petitions Criminal Nos. 666-70 of 1992, 1997 (6), SCC 241, before J.S. Verma, C.J and Sujata V. Manohar and B.N. Kirpal, JJ.

(ii) Unreported Judgments:

Mr. Bogy Vs. Union of India, The Gauhati High Court, High Court of Assam, Nagaland, Meghalaya, Manipur, Tripura, Mizoram, Arunachal Pradesh. Civil Rule No. 1847/89, before C.J and Phuken, J.

Digvijay Mote Vs. Govt of India and another, High Court of Karnataka at Bangakore, Writ Appeal No. 354 of 1994, before MR.S.B.Majumdar, C.J and N.D.V. Bhat, J.

Dr. Malavika Karlekar Vs. Union of India and others, Writ Petition Criminal No 583 of 1992, SCC, before C.J and Yogeshwar Dayal, J.

Gurinder Singh and Others Vs. Union of India, Criminal Writ Petition 871 of 1994, High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh. Ms. Sumbul Rizvi Khan and Mr. Ajay Shada, Advocates, before V.K. Jhanji Judge. On 20.11.1994.

Mst. Khadija a.k.a Kjudija Vs. Union of India and Others, Criminal Writ Petition No. 658 of 1997, High Court of Delhi, before Y.K. Sabharwal J and A. K. Srivastava J.

Ms. Lailoma Wafa Vs. Union of India and Others, Criminal Writ Petition No.312 of 1998, High Court of Delhi, before Devinder Gupta, J and N.G. Nandi, J.

The Maiwand’s Trust of Afghan Human Freedom Petitioners Vs. State of Punjab and Others, Criminal Writ Petition No. 125 of 1986, SCC, before, Justice O. Chinappa Reddy and V. Khalid.

Mr. Majid Ahmed Abdul Majid Mohd. Jad Al-Hak Vs. Union of India and Others, Criminal Writ Petition No.60 of 1997, High Court of Delhi, before, Arun Kumar and N.G. Nandi J.

Mr. Malika Marui Safi Vs. State of Delhi, Criminal.M.(M) No. 1135 of 1997, High Court of Delhi, before, Manmohan Sarin J.

N.D. Pancholi Vs. State of Punjab and Others, Criminal Writ Petition No. 243 of 1988, SCC, Advocate Mr. S.K. Bisaria.

P. Shanmungam, J. and S.K. Krishnan, J. Yogeswari Vs. The State of Tamil Nadu and Others, Habeas Corpus Petition No. 971 of 2001, High Court of Madras.

Premavathy e Rajathi and Others Vs. The State of Tamil Nadu and Others, H.C.P Nos. 1038, 1118, 1119, 1120, 1121, 1122, 1123, 1085, 1170 and 1226 of 2003, High Court of Madras, before, Justice V.S. Sirapurkar and M. Thanikachalam.

Sayed Ata Mohamamdi Vs. Union of India and Others, A.D. 1458 of 1994, High Court of Kerala, before, G.D.Kamat and Vishnu Saha, JJ.

Shah Ghazai and another Vs. Union of India and Others, Criminal Writ Petition No. 499 of 1996, High Court of Punjab, Haryana and Chandigarh, before, S.S. Sudhakar, J.

Shri Shar Aung a.k.a Aung Thant Min Vs. Union of India, Criminal Writ Petition No. 110 of 1998, High Court of Delhi, before, Devinder Gupta, N.G. Nandi, J.

State Vs. Asghar Nikookar Rahimi, C.c. No. 151 of 1998, District Munsif cum Judicial Magistrate Court Alandur, before, Ethiraj Judicial Magistrate.

State Vs. In Re Eva Massar Musa Ahmed, FIR No. 278 of 1995, Metropolitan Magistrate Court New Delhi, before, Ravinder Dudeja.

In Re Eva Massar Musa Ahmed Vs. State, F.I.R – No. 278 of 1995, Metropolitan Magistrate Court New Delhi, before, Ravinder Dudeja.

State Vs. Farid Ali Khan, 1995, Metropolitan Magistrate Court New Delhi, before, Ms. Seema Maini.

State Vs. Gafoor Zarin and Others, U/Sec. 355 of Cr.P.C, 2001, Metropolitan Magistrate 22nd Court. Andheri, Mumbai.

State Vs. Hudson Vilvaraj, F.I.R No. 583/97 of 1998, Metropolitan Magistrate Court Delhi, before, Gurdeep Singh.

State Vs. Jamil Ahmed, F.I.R No. 445/89 of 1994, Metropolitan Magistrate Court, Delhi, before, Shri Bharat Parashar.

State Vs. Kishan Chand and Habid Iranpur, Criminal case No. 66/96, Advocate Ms. Sumbul Rizvi Khan.

State Vs. Mahmood Gajol, S.T.No.6 of 1994, U/SS 419, 240, 467, 471 of I.P.C and 3/6 of P.P Act & 14 of Foreigner Act, Judicial Magistrate, Maharajganj, before, SH. M.P. Singh.

State Vs. Majad Abdul Raheman Darendash, C.C. No. 66/P/2002 (LAC No. 207/2002), of 2003, Metropolitan Magistrate, 14th Court, Girgaum, Mumbai, before, N.V. Nhavkar.

State Vs. Mohd. Ehsan, FIR No. 435/93. U/S 14 of Foreigners Act. R.C.C.C.No. 162/94, J.M.F.C. Cantonment Court, Pune, Sh.B.W.Pawar.

State Vs. Mohd. Riza Ali, FIR No.414/93. ACMM, New Delhi, before, V.K Malhotra.

State Vs. Mohd. Yaashin, U/S 14 of Foreigners Act and IPC 420, 471. MM Delhi, before Bharat Parashar.

State Vs. Montasir M. Gubara, C.C. No. 427/P/1994, Addl. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, 37th Court, Esplande, Mumbai, before, S.N. Chimade.

State of Maharashtra Vs. Mustafe Jama Ahmed, R.C.C. No.162/94, J.M.F.C. Cantonment Court, Pune, before, SH.B.W.Pawar.

State Vs. K. Htoon Htoon S/o Uhla Htoon and 4 others, F.I.R. 18 (3) 89 SGT.P.S, of 23 December, 1994. Judicial Magistrate Churachandpur, Manipur, before, Kh. Brajachand Singh.

State Vs. Teresi, Case No.406 of 1996, Chief Judicial Magistrate Kozhikode.

State Vs. Thang cin Thawn, F.I.R No. 330/01, Case No. 134 of 2002. Metropolitan Magistrate Court, New Delhi, before, Sanjay Garg.

U.Myat Kyaw and another Vs. State of Manipur and another, Civil Rule No. 516 of 1991, Gauhati High Court Imphal Bench, before, Justice W.A. Shishak and S. Barman Roy.

Ms. Zothansangpuii Vs. State of Manipur and another, Civil Rule No. 981 of 1989, Gauwahati High Court Imphal Bench, before, Justice S.n. Phukan and M. Sharma.

(iii) Important International Judgments:

Asylum Case (Colombia/Peru), United Nations, 20.11.1950.

Ahmed Vs. Austria, European Court for Human Rights, 17.12.1996.

Amuur Vs. France, European Court for Human Rights, 25.06.1996.

A And Another Vs. Minister of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs and Another, High Court of Australia, 24.02.1997, before, Brennan CJ, Dawson, McHugh, Gummow and Kirby JJ.

Canada (Attorney General) Vs. Ward, Supreme Court of Canada, 2 S.C.R. 689 of 1993.

Chen Shi Hai Vs. The Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, High Court of Australia, HCA 19; P41/1999 of 2000.

Joseph Adjei Vs. Minister of Employment and Immigration, Federal Court of Canada, A-676-88.

VI – Conclusion

International refugee law contains the definition of the term “refugee” and lays down the extent of protection a state should give to refugees and the obligation of states to find durable solution to their problems. When the 1951 Convention was adopted, the plight of victims of persecution between two world wars was still fresh in the minds of the Europeans. The result was the adoption of the term “refugee” characterized by individualized persecution for reasons of race, religion, and nationality, membership of a particular group or opinion. At that time the refugee problems were largely restricted to the European continent only. It was soon realized that persecution is a universal phenomenon and persecuted people need to be protected everywhere. As a result the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees was adopted. It removed the temporal and geographical limitations of the definition envisaged under the 1951 Convention. Today there is a near universality of obligation for protection of refugee who flees their countries fearing persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular group or political opinion.

The developing countries in Asia, Africa, Arab and Latin America have also started experiencing the forced movement of people across the international frontiers owing to international or internal conflicts, struggle against foreign domination, or events seriously disturbing public order. To resolve the problems of these refugees at the regional level, the Organization of the African Unity adopted OAU Convention on the status of refugees in 1969. In Asia the AALCC adopted the Bangkok Principle, 1966. In 1970 acknowledging the broader definition of the term refuges the benefit of Articles IV and V of the Bangkok Principles 1966 was extended to those who fall in that definition. Countries in Latin America have also resolved to apply international standards to protect the refugees who flee their countries owing to gross violation of human rights.

Once in India, legally or illegally, refugees offer to face a problem residing in the country. This is because either their travel or stay documents (Indian visa, for instance) have expired, or they are unable to renew them, or they are not able to acquire any documents to begin with. Occasionally, the foreigner’s regional registration office has refused to issue or renew residential permits because the refugee did not have valid passports. This should not, however, exclude them from being treated as refugees under international law. Varying treatment has been accorded to different groups of refugees with respect to their stay in India. The policies that govern different refugee groups are rarely formalized as written rules; they can be inferred from the actions of the government. This may create some ambiguity in the minds of researcher who are accustomed to dealing with codified rules and regulations. It is therefore very important in the subject of refugee law to keep abreast of the latest development in this field.

However, today apart from these political and humanitarian refugees’ different kinds of problems arising for reasons of economic problems of Liberalization, Privatization and Globalization (LPG). It affects the people’s socio-economic and cultural rights. Peoples leave their habitual resident places to search for better place to survive. Mostly it is happening in developing countries. There are other man-made disasters created by developed nations in poor countries especially through armed intervention in Iraq, Afghanistan, Sudan, Somalia, Syria, Lebanon and Libya. The poor nation peoples are seeking refugee status in developing countries only. They can’t reach Europe or Western countries. Their laws are very restrictive for these people. Western countries practicing Cuban Haitian syndrome that means choosing refugees and European countries welcoming and like refugees to using refugees as a cheap labor. In other words, developed nations are functioning like refugee producers, and Third World countries like India are functioning like refugee keepers. The 1951 Convention is the only international legal instrument directly and exhaustively dealing with the rights of refugees. Unfortunately, this Convention only speaks about refugees fleeing persecution because of violation of civil and political rights. The gaps in the Convention regime are being filled by the regional instruments. It is the only hope for those in who search for a place for to live in dignity.

The Supreme Court of India has consistently upheld the principle of non-refoulement, though without specifically mentioning it, an important principle in international refugee law. But as the former chief Justice of India J S Verma has pointed out, “the attempt to fill the void by judicial creativity can only be a temporary phase. Legislation alone will provide permanent solution”. It clearly shows that India must have a domestic legal and legislative framework to help guide its response to the refugee issue. Similarly the Supreme Court in Malavika Karlekar v. Union of India and the Guwhati High Court in Bogyi v. Union of India went to the extent of staying the deportation orders as well as allow them to seek refugee status from UNHCR. In Nedumaran and Dr. S. Ramadoss v. Union of India, the Madras high court stayed the involuntary repatriation and laid special emphasis on UNHCR’s role as an impartial third party in verifying the voluntary repatriation. In Digvijay Mote v. Government of India, the High Court of Karnataka extended humanitarian assistance to about 150 refugee children of Sri Lankan origin. These developments indicate a positive approach to the problems of refugees. In-state of Arunachal Pradesh v. Khudiram Chakma, the court held that the aliens are entitled to certain minimum rights necessary to the enjoyment of ordinary private life. In Louis Raedt v. Union of India, the court held that some of the fundamental rights are available to foreigners as well. The courts have stayed deportation orders in many cases pending refugee status and/or citizenship applications. Recently, on September 20, 2011, a trial Court in Dwarka, NCT of Delhi pointed out that the need for enacting comprehensive legislation to deal exclusively with the problems of refugees had arisen from time immemorial, and finally, pursuant extensive deliberations on a model national law: The Refugee and Asylum Seekers (Protection) Bill, 2006 was drafted. But it is unfortunate that despite its having been drafted after due deliberations and after various rounds of consultations by eminent jurist including the former Chief Justice of India, P.N. Bhagwati, this bill has not seen the light of the day. The judge also mentioned, there have been a plethora of instances wherein Indian courts tried to evolve a humane and compassionate approach to redress individual problems; however, Indian needs to live up to its humanitarian goals.It is therefore high time to enact a domestic legislative framework to help guide its response to the refugee issue.

The Indian Judiciary System is the only platform for refugees to protect their rights in India. Above discussed cases are the examples in this issue. Judiciary consistently guiding the Indian government to enact national legislation for refugees in so many cases particularly in Chandra Kumar V State. Most of the cases in India supporting refugees right except some cases like Luis De Raedt v. Union of India this case using against refugees. In contemporary situation apart from political issues cultural practice forcing some community people to seek asylum in aliens' land reflection of Naz Foundation case. However, the first human rights forum written in Kalinga now Orissa by the king Asoka and now it’s updated in UN Declarations of Human Rights it says “All humans are one family and All Man My Children”. Targeting a particular group and miss campaigning against the people is the recent trend in India. ( “We should not be misled by the Sangh Parivar's misdirected campaigns against Bangladeshi and other Muslims seeking their expulsion from India”. Rajeev Dhavan (2008) India’s refugee law and policy.) But, refugees are hard-working community to restart their life what they lost in their past, it makes them unique and intellectual in international community for example, “Jesus, Muhammad, Dalai Lama, Albert Einstein, Karl Marx, Lenin, Sigmund Freud, Jackie Chan, MIA, etc. In India, refugee Prime Minister I.K. Kujral, former Deputy Prime Minister L.K. Advani” ( Jesus family fled from Israel because of king herod. Muhammad fled from Mecca to Medina in 577. Dalai Lama fled from Tibet to India when China invaded. Albert Einstein E=MC2 gravity theory scientist German - Jewish refugee he was also stateless for 5 years at the end of 19th century. Karl Marx author of Das Capital, political theorist and German refugee. Lenin Soviet leader and a refugee who fled to Switzerland. Sigmund Freud Austrian Jew, author of interpretation of dreams and founded psychoanalysis he fled from Nazism in Austria. Jackie Chan martial arts actor fled to U.S from Hong Kong after being threatened with death by the Triads. MIA Arulpragasam famous Grammy award pop singer in U.K. part of a Tamil Sri Lankan refugee family., I.K.Kujral former Indian prime minister introduced 5 important diplomatic theory fled from Pakistan to Indian in partition time. L.K. Advani born in Karachi Studied in Lahore worked as a teacher in Pakistan and he lost everything in the partition time and he fled to India and become a deputy Prime minister of India because of his hard work ). etc the lists are so long. However, the international community fully understands that producing refugee is the worst thing for human civilization that’s why Rome catholic pope washed refugees foots. (Pope John Paul washed 12 Refugees Foots including Hindu Refugee from Pakistan in Vatican City of Rome. Availeble at: https://www.americamagazine.org/con...et-refugees-different-religions-and-countries). to clean the sin of this world. And also accepting refugee’s shows rich civilization of the community, word like:

“YAATHUM OOREY YAAVARUM KEELIR” ( It means “To us all towns are one, all men our kin,” written by Tamil Poetry Kaniyan Poonkundranar in 1000 BC, from Magipalan Patti Village Sivaganga District Tamil Nadu India and now it’s quoted in United Nations General Assembly).


Dedicated To Refugee Friends of T2F.
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